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SPLITSYLVANIA: STATE SECESSION AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT
Glenn Harlan Reynolds*
INTRODUCTION
From Is New California Unconstitutional? A Centennial Reflection, 210
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2122):
Brace yourselves for this one, Desert Riders. New California might not
legitimately be a State of the Union, but a mere illegal breakaway province of the
State of California.
In the summer of 2021, following the California financial crisis and CalPers
pension collapse, public employee-supporting Democrats from the California
General Assembly absented themselves from the state, preventing a quorum so
that legislation slashing pension payouts could not be passed. That absence
stretched from days into weeks, as the state government largely shut down for
lack of funding. Seizing on this moment, thirty-four counties from the eastern
and rural parts of what was then California organized themselves and sent
representatives to Fresno, where those representatives declared themselves the
new, official California General Assembly and designated individuals of their
choice as the new, official Governor and Attorney General.
The new legislature and officials were quickly recognized by President Trump,
who, citing his authority under the Insurrection Act and Article IV, Section 4 of
the U.S. Constitution, deemed them the official government of the state, and sent
federal troops from the 101st Airborne Division to Fresno to ensure that what he
called “leftovers” of the “old, failed state government” were unable to “cause
trouble.” President Trump’s recognition was echoed in a joint resolution of the
Republican-controlled Congress, which perhaps anticipated the addition of two
new Republican Senators.
Immediately thereafter, the now duly recognized California legislature in Fresno
petitioned Congress to be allowed to split California into two states. A narrow
coastal strip extending from Los Angeles County in the South to Sonoma County
in the North would remain the state of California; the rest would become the new
© 2019 Glenn Harlan Reynolds. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as
each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and
includes this provision and copyright notice.
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state of New California. Congress, at the President’s recommendation,
immediately approved this change, and the state of New California was born.
(Acquiescence to this scheme, the prior government of California was told, was
a prerequisite to any federal bailout, but judicial review seemed unlikely anyway,
as the Supreme Court had already held federal recognition of state governments
to be a political question as far back as Luther v. Borden1).
But could they do this? Was this change—though literally within the wording of
the Constitution—legitimate? Well, there is the precedent of West Virginia to
consider.

This “future history”—borrowing heavily in places from Vasan Kesavan and
2
3
Michael Stokes Paulsen’s Is West Virginia Unconstitutional? —is farfetched. But
the larger issue of intrastate secession is a growing one, and it would be helpful to
address it, and perhaps to relieve the pressure, before things reach a more difficult
pass.
In fact, intrastate secession is the true secession fever: not the perennial
postelection calls of losing parties to secede from a nation controlled by the
opposition, but a growing movement for secession from states, with the rural parts
of states (sometimes geographically very large parts of states) wanting to separate
from the population-dense urban areas that essentially control state decisionmaking.
Feeling ignored, put-upon, and mistreated, secessionists want to take their fate into
their own hands. These movements are common, but not likely to succeed on their
own, as intrastate secession is, though not entirely unknown (see, e.g., West
Virginia), very difficult to achieve.
But these movements do indicate a widespread sense of dissatisfaction among
(mostly rural) populations who feel that they are governed by people in distant urban
centers who know little, and care less, about their way of life. Such sentiments,
which in a way resemble those regarding Britain in the lead-up to the American
4
Revolution, have probably worsened since the Supreme Court’s line of cases
5
beginning with Baker v. Carr weakened rural areas’ political position in favor of
urban areas. This problem was, to a degree, foreseen by contemporary critics of
6
those decisions.

1
2

48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF.
L. REV. 291 (2002).
3 While the future history is fiction, the New California movement is real. See infra Part I.
4 See GORDON S. WOOD, REPRESENTATION IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 10 (rev. ed.
2008). Colonists argued that members of Parliament were faraway “perfect strangers” to America,
who were “not bound in interest, duty, or affection” to Americans. Id. (citations omitted).
5 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that unlike federal government,
state governments are constitutionally forbidden from apportioning seats on basis other than
population); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding that state redistricting presents a
justiciable question).
6 See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: “Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 156 (1964).
Kurland characterized Warren Court jurisprudence as using equality to force uniformity. See id.
In the context of Reynolds v. Sims, he observed: “To a Court determined to make population the
sole standard on the theory of majority rule, all other factors become irrelevant.” Id.
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In this short Essay, I will describe the problem, and suggest some ways in
which—without overturning existing Supreme Court precedent or engaging in the
sort of constitutional brinksmanship described above—Congress might remedy this
dissatisfaction. Though there is no particular reason why the number of states in the
United States should remain fixed at fifty, I will suggest that there are, in fact,
remedies short of secession. The result of addressing these concerns, I hope, will be
a less-polarized and angry national politics, and perhaps a smaller chance of serious
turmoil.
I.

THE PROBLEM

Intrastate secession is not exactly new in the United States: West Virginia was
7
once part of Virginia, for example, and Tennessee was once part of North Carolina,
8
though that evolution was less fraught. But in recent years we have seen a number
of states facing calls to split, from inhabitants of regions who feel effectively
unrepresented.
In New York State, for example, there have been repeated calls to split upstate
New York from the New York City region. One such proposal involves letting the
New York City area keep the name “New York,” while the new upstate state would
9
be named “New Amsterdam.” The reason? “We’re completely overwhelmed . . .
by the policies of New York City,” according to New York State Senator Joseph
10
11
Robach. The idea has been circulating for over twenty-five years, but now seems
to be gaining some degree of additional support.
Perhaps better publicized is Silicon Valley entrepreneur Tim Draper’s plan to
split California into six states, one of which would be, essentially, Silicon Valley’s
12
13
own preserve. Though Draper’s plan did not make the 2016 ballot, it served as
a useful outlet for complaints about unrepresented parts of the state. Draper
explained his initiative this way:
7 See generally Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2.
8 Inhabitants of the counties west of the Appalachians attempted to secede from North
Carolina and form their own State of Franklin, which failed, but upon ratifying the Constitution in
1789, North Carolina ceded those territories to the federal government, which recognized the state
of Tennessee in 1796. TRE HARGETT, SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 2017–2018, at
547–51 (2017).
9 Justin Moore, Could New York Become Two Separated States?, WKBW (May 14, 2016),
http://www.wkbw.com/news/new-york-could-become-two-separated-states.
10 Jill Terreri, Splitting New York State?, N.Y. STATE SENATE (Dec. 23, 2009) (omission in
original), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/in-the-news/joseph-e-robach/splitting-new-yorkstate (statement of Sen. Joseph Robach).
11 Id. (“The idea has been around the state Legislature at least since 1991.”).
12 Gregory Ferenstein, Tim Draper Wants to Split California into Pieces and Turn Silicon
Valley into Its Own State, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 19, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/12/19/timdraper-six-californias-secede-silicon-valley-ballot-initiative/; see also Philip Bump, There’s a Plan
to Split California into 6 States. Here’s What It Might Look Like, WASH. POST (July 15, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/07/15/theres-a-plan-to-split-californiainto-6-states-heres-what-it-might-look-like/?utm_term=.9ed7b8c22766.
13 Laura Mandaro, ‘Six Californias’ Fails to Make California Ballot, USA TODAY (Sept. 12,
2014),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/09/12/six-californias-failsballot/15534081/.
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1. It is about time California was properly represented with Senators in
Washington. Now our number of Senators per person will be about average.
2. Competition is good, monopolies are bad. This initiative encourages more
competition and less monopolistic power. Like all competitive systems, costs
will be lower and service will be better.
3. Each new state can start fresh. From a new crowd sourced state flower to a
more relevant constitution.
4. Decisions can be more relevant to the population. The regulations in one new
state are not appropriate for another.
5. Individuals can move between states more freely.14

Some such initiative might also please the residents of inland and northern
California, who feel that the California state government—with its heavy interests
in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas—views them with indifference or even
hostility.15 Writing in the Los Angeles Daily News, demographer Joel Kotkin
compared these neglected, poverty-stricken regions of California to apartheid-era
South Africa’s “Bantustans,” observing:
Fresno, Bakersfield, Ontario and San Bernardino are rapidly becoming the
Bantustans—the impoverished areas designed for Africans under the racist South
African regime—in California’s geographic apartheid. Poverty rates in the
Central Valley and Inland Empire reach over a third of the population, well above
the share in the Bay Area. By some estimates, rural California counties suffer
the highest unemployment rate in the country; six of the 10 metropolitan areas in
the country with the highest percentage of jobless are located in the central and
eastern parts of the state. The interior counties—from San Bernardino to
Merced—also suffer the worst health conditions in the state.
This disparity has worsened in recent years . . . .
But state policies, notably those tied to Gov. Jerry Brown’s climate jihad,
suggests Inland Empire economist John Husing, have placed California “at war”
with blue-collar industries like homebuilding, energy, agriculture and
manufacturing. These kinds of jobs are critical for regions where almost half the
workforce has a high school education or less.

....
Weighed down by coastal-imposed regulations, the interior is losing its allure
for relocating firms. Many firms fleeing regulation, high taxes and housing costs
used to head inland. Now, many are migrating to Nevada, Texas, Arizona and
16
other states.

Outweighed by the population centers on the coast, and with that dominance
undiluted by the geographic districting banned in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v.
Sims, inhabitants of these “Bantustans” are unable to obtain relief via democratic
politics. Under Draper’s plan, they would enjoy self-government and would be able

14 Ferenstein, supra note 12 (quoting Tim Draper, a California entrepreneur).
15 Joel Kotkin, The Other California: A Flyover State Within a State, L.A. DAILY NEWS
(Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20170410/the-other-california-a-flyoverstate-within-a-state-joel-kotkin.
16 Id.
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to choose whether to live under the sort of arrangements that find support along the
coast, or something different.
Somewhat less ambitious is a plan (the basis for the future history above) to
split the wealthy coastal regions of California from the remainder, leaving the state
of “New California” to be made up of most of the state’s rural areas. As CBS News
reports:
[U]nlike other separation movements in the past, the state of New California
wants to do things by the book, citing Article 4, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution
and working with the state legislature to get it done, similar to the way West
Virginia was formed.

....
The group is organized with committees and a council of county
representatives, but say it will take 10 to 18 months before they are ready to fully
engage with the state legislature.17

The goal is to let the rural areas govern themselves in ways more suited to their
18
needs, while the wealthy coastal regions do the same.
A similar dynamic obtains in Washington State, where some legislators are
reviving a proposal, dating back to 1915, to separate Eastern Washington into its
19
own state, provisionally named “Liberty” :
The political divide has only increased in recent years. The western part of
the state, particularly the Seattle area, has supported initiatives legalizing
marijuana and same-sex marriage and expanding gun background checks,
proposals opposed by the majority of Eastern Washington voters.
“Urbanization and rapid growth in the western portion of Washington state
have progressively heightened this divergence of cultural and economic values
from that of the eastern portion of the state,” the bill says.
The new bill is also sponsored by Reps. Matt Shea of Spokane Valley and
David Taylor of Moxee.
The task force the bill seeks to create would look at the legal and political
processes for making a boundary change, according to the bill’s text. The task
force would determine whether the states would be divided along existing county

17 New California Declares “Independence” From Rest of State, CBS NEWS (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-california-declares-independence-from-rest-ofstate/?ftag=CNM-00-10aab7e&linkId=47001582 [hereinafter New California Independence]. The
New California movement has a website, featuring proposed maps, declarations, and grievances.
New California: The 51st State, NEW CAL. STATE, https://newcaliforniastate.com (last visited Dec.
30, 2018).
18 New California Independence, supra note 17.
19 Jim Camden, Matt Shea, Bob McCaslin Propose Creating New State Called “Liberty” in
Eastern
Washington,
SPOKESMAN-REV.
(Dec.
7,
2016),
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2016/dec/07/matt-shea-bob-mccaslin-propose-creating-newstate-/; see also Geoff Folsom, Tri-City Legislators Want Eastern Washington to Secede from the
State,
TRI-CITY
HERALD
(Jan.
28,
2015),
http://www.tri-cityherald.com/latestnews/article32213466.html.
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lines or newly drawn lines. It would also have to consider issues like dividing up
20
the tax bases, prison beds and transportation systems.

Next door in Oregon, similar sentiments are at play. Like Washington State,
Oregon is divided, “geographically, culturally, and politically,” by the Cascade
Range, with the urban, liberal, environmentally conscious western coastal region
setting policies that find little favor across the mountains in the blue-collar eastern
part of the state, where industries revolve around things like farming, ranching, and
21
mining. That creates a sharp divide. As one Oregon resident explained, “[r]ural
Oregonians . . . see Portland as an alien entity. Portland sees rural Oregonians as a
bunch of hayseeds dragging their knuckles on the ground.”22 As others have
observed:
The skepticism is based on a simple principle: democratic local control is
better than ignorant distant bureaucracy. Urban progressives shouldn’t have
trouble grasping this because it cuts both ways. Elitists in the cities are no more
capable of competently running rural affairs than a bunch of ranchers could
effectively micromanage urban affairs from the middle of nowhere.
Eastern Oregon’s resistance to environmental activists is based partly on this
leave-me-alone libertarianism and partly on the fact that many people use the
land to earn a living—and also, perhaps, on how the environment affects human
beings differently on each side of the mountains. Western Oregon’s climate is
wet in the winter but relatively comfortable all year, even during heat waves and
cold snaps. The climate in Eastern Oregon is harsher. “I grew up 18 miles
outside of Bend in the era before cell phones,” [journalist Mark Hemingway]
says, “and if your car breaks down on the wrong road in the wrong time of the
year at the wrong time of night in four feet of snow, you might die. People out
there have more of a nineteenth-century naturalist view of nature, where you have
23
to respect it and also fear and loathe it when necessary.”

Unsurprisingly, laws based on one worldview do not often sit well with people
who entertain the other. In Oregon, this has led to calls for Eastern Oregon to secede
24
from the state, among other things. Advocates propose perhaps joining Idaho, a
25
state with which Eastern Oregon has more in common.

20 Folsom, supra note 19 (quoting H.R. 1818, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015)).
21 Michael J. Totten, Fractured West, CITY J. (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.cityjournal.org/html/fractured-west-15611.html.
22 Id.
23 Id. (quoting journalist Mark Hemingway).
24 See Grant Darrow, Is It Time for Eastern Oregon to Secede From the State?, ARGUS
OBSERVER (June 23, 2015), http://www.argusobserver.com/opinion/is-it-time-for-rural-oregon-tosecede-from-the/article_3cd77c2e-19c8-11e5-a7bf-8b0f949373cc.html; see also Anna Griffin,
Far-Fetched as They Might Seem, Secession Movements Are Thriving in the Pacific Northwest,
OPB (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.opb.org/news/article/pacific-northwest-secession-state-ofjefferson-cascadia/ (describing multiple secession movements, including one to combine a large
portion of the Pacific Northwest, including eastern Washington and eastern Oregon, into a region
called “Cascadia,” with state flags already selling out).
25 Jade McDowell, Eastern Oregon Man Calls for Secession to Idaho, IDAHO PRESS (Sept.
26, 2015), https://www.idahopress.com/news/state/eastern-oregon-man-calls-for-secession-toidaho/article_a80df4b4-640a-11e5-a5f2-ab7c588ac148.html.
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There is even talk about splitting downstate Illinois away from Chicagoland.
Once again, the downstate hinterland contains a lot of people (but, despite their much
greater geographic extent, fewer in population than the Chicago metro area) who
feel unrepresented, and believe that Chicago’s dominance of the state causes
downstate tax dollars to flow toward politicians’ vote-buying efforts in Chicago.
These secession movements are not likely to be firing on Fort Sumter, or
whatever the modern equivalent is, anytime soon. But we live in a time when
centrifugal forces seem to be testing centripetal ones (note the recent efforts at
Scottish and Catalonian independence, for example), and the presence of these
secessionist sentiments is an indication that people in the hinterlands feel poorly
served by majoritarian political systems. Historically, such sentiments tend to fester
and sometimes erupt in violence. Is that something that can be fixed?
I think that it can. The straightforward—though not easy—approach would be
to just split these states up: Washington and Oregon (and maybe New York and
Illinois) into two states, California into two, five, or six depending on your plan. Of
course, under Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution, it is not as easy as that:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State
shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State
be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the
27
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

Legislative consent, required at both the state and federal levels, is likely to be
difficult to get, barring unusual developments like a state financial breakdown.
California’s political leadership, for example, likely enjoys running a large and
wealthy state. Breaking it into several states would diminish that.28 And in the case
of California, and particularly Illinois, federal legislators might have leverage to
promote a breakup in exchange for federal financial bailouts, should those become
necessary.
At the national level, breaking up states is likely to affect the balance in the
U.S. Senate, meaning that it will almost always be opposed by whichever party
stands to lose from it. A sufficient Senate majority by one party might overcome
that problem, but it would be an enormously contentious issue. Even legislators who
stood to gain politically might worry about the precedent. Would another party split
states further to change the balance again? The need for state legislators to approve
another split would provide some sort of a limit, but how much?
At any rate, it should be possible to alleviate many of these problems without
taking such a drastic step. In the remainder of this Essay, I will sketch out a number

26 Rich Miller, Does Rauner Want Downstate to Secede?, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (June 17,
2016),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20160618/ISSUE11/306189991/does-raunerwant-downstate-to-secede; see also Kim Geiger et al., Rauner Rips ‘Chicago Bailout’ as Overtime
Jockeying
on
Budget
Begins,
CHI.
TRIB.
(June
1,
2016),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-budget-rauner-madigan-met-060220160602-story.html.
27 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
28 On the other hand, while California currently has one Governor, one Chief Justice, one
Attorney General, etc., a broken-up California might have six such offices, giving more politicians
an opportunity to be big fish, at the cost of dwelling in smaller, though still sizable, ponds.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3130497

108

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 94:3

of proposals, some of them surprisingly simple, at both the state and federal levels,
for addressing the underlying concerns.
II.

SOLUTIONS

One seemingly obvious solution—overturning the Supreme Court’s decisions
29
in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims —is unlikely to be a solution at all. Even if
the Court were inclined to reverse those decisions, which it shows no sign of being,
doing so would not return things to the status quo ante. Under the post-Baker
districting system, it would be urban legislators wielding the most power in any
30
redistricting effort. That egg would be difficult indeed to unscramble.
Nonetheless, there are things that both Congress and the states can do. Where
Congress is concerned, the careful use of federal legislative powers, especially in
sensitive areas like environmental and labor law, might restore to rural areas a
sufficient degree of autonomy that secessionist sentiments, and general unhappiness,
might be substantially reduced. In short, federal law often preempts state law on
various grounds, and I suggest local autonomy as one more.
Federal laws regulating wages, working conditions, firearms, and
environmental matters generally allow for states to pass more stringent laws
governing themselves, in respect of state autonomy. But where the population of
states is unevenly distributed, so that inhabitants of rural regions are effectively
unrepresented, the autonomy thus preserved is lopsided. It is, in essence, the
autonomy of a majority to make laws that an effectively unrepresented minority
finds oppressive.
The federal government’s legislative role has traditionally been the opposite:
to use (as in the case of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) a national majority to ensure that
local majorities cannot oppress local minorities. I thus suggest that federal laws
regulating these key subject-matter areas be recast to preempt more restrictive state
laws, meaning that urban areas would be unable to impose stricter laws on lesspowerful rural areas. If this seems too inflexible, perhaps that preemption should in
some cases be defeasible at the county level. If the government of a county
affirmatively wants to accept stricter state regulations, then it may do so; but if not,
then the federal regulations are a ceiling, as well as a floor.
Given the expansive reach of federal legislative power today, states would have
31
difficulty challenging this approach as beyond federal authority. And given the
federal government’s traditional role, since the adoption of the Civil War
Amendments, of protecting local minorities from oppression by local majorities,
such an approach is not that much of a departure. It might even find support in an
earlier part of the Constitution, the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section 4, which
29 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
30 Likewise, it is possible that Congress has power to legislate geographic districting under
its Guaranty Clause powers (I have a proof for this proposition, but it is too large to fit in the margin)
but even so, the district-drawing would be done by the states’ current power structures. It is not
impossible to imagine a federal legislative solution to this, but I think it is fair to call such a solution
vanishingly unlikely.
31 In some cases, the requisite preemption could probably be accomplished via administrative
regulations.
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provides that the United States “shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
32
Republican Form of Government.”
33
The Guaranty Clause is generally regarded (though perhaps wrongly) as
providing no basis for judicial action, but it is listed among the powers of Congress
as they relate to the states, and seems to grant sufficient legislative power for
Congress to protect local interests from exploitation and domination at the hands of
legislative representatives who do not represent them. As mentioned earlier, such
complaints regarding the British Parliament and its domination of the American
colonies were a centerpiece of the American Revolution, with deep resentment
regarding rule by faraway representatives who did not share in the circumstances or
34
values of the ruled.
It is difficult to imagine the Framers regarding such
domination by distant elites as part of a legitimately Republican form of government.
What Congress would be doing here can be seen as a form of representation35
reinforcement, using John Hart Ely’s phrase, to protect legislative minorities from
unwarranted harm.
Indeed, the position of rural districts in heavily urbanized states looks very
much like another classic case of representation-reinforcement in which “more
searching judicial inquiry” is justified where legislation targets “discrete and insular
36
minorities” and where ordinary political processes seem unlikely to provide relief.
Inhabitants of rural parts of heavily urbanized states often have very different values
and lifestyles, are generally stigmatized by the urban ruling class as “hicks” “rubes”
and “rednecks ,” and lack comparable access not only to political power, but to
media and other avenues that might be used to challenge the majority. Because their
lifestyles and economic base are sharply different from inhabitants of urban areas,
legislation that oppresses them can be enacted with limited impact on urban
inhabitants.
These characteristics argue both for a congressional power to protect rural
inhabitants against local majorities, and also for judicial evaluation, both of state
laws and of federal remedies, conducted so as to keep this dynamic in mind. But
there are also things that states can do, if they wish to limit secessionist sentiment.
There is nothing to stop a state from being mindful of the differences between
urban and rural areas when crafting legislation or regulations. States could adopt a
local-option regulatory scheme relating to key subject areas on their own, and by
doing so would lighten their footprint in rural areas and lessen the likelihood of
festering resentments. It is possible that urban voters would resist this, but it seems
equally likely that they might have little enough knowledge of, or interest in,
conditions in rural areas that no significant resistance is forthcoming.

32 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
33 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184–85 (1992) (suggesting that not all issues
under Guaranty Clause are nonjusticiable (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964))).
34 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
35 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
36 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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CONCLUSION
The rise of New California after a California state financial crisis remains
unlikely. But if the federal government—and perhaps that of California as well—
can maintain a degree of sensitivity, it may also be made unnecessary.
State secession movements may never go away entirely, but relatively modest
efforts may cause them to lose most of their salience. In this short Essay, I have
argued that allowing different standards for urban and rural areas in key subjectmatter areas, something that can be done by both state and federal governments
without any constitutional changes, is likely to accomplish that goal. I believe that
little of value would be lost by this approach, and much, potentially, might be saved.
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